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ARTICLES
CAN STATE HEALTH REFORM
INITIATIVES ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL
COVERAGE? CALIFORNIA' S RECENT
FAILED EXPERIMENT
SUSAN A. CHANNICK*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
Not very long ago, health care reform was near or at the top of the
national political agenda. Alarmed at health care spending that topped out
at $2.1 trillion in 2006 while forty-five to fifty million Americans were
completely uninsured, it seemed inevitable that the forty-fourth President
of the United States would have to take some action to achieve universal or
near-universal access to health care. At least, this was the thinking before
the arrival of the current banking and liquidity crisis which may cost the
federal government and of course the taxpayers as much as one trillion
dollars.' This money, which the government will have to borrow by raising
the national debt ceiling to almost eleven trillion dollars,2 will be used to
bail out institutions that offered cheap credit and created an unsustainable
housing bubble as well as the institutions that securitized subprime
mortgages and sold them globally. 3 The problem now is not too much credit
but too little, and many believe that the main goal of government bailout
money is to create liquidity in the credit market, an experiment which is
currently taking the form of recapitalizing major banks.4 This fiscal disaster
managed to push almost everything else off the front page, including news
. Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; Cornell University, BA, 1965; California
Western School of Law, JD, 1980; Harvard University, MPH, 2001.
On Friday, October 3, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008. Pub. L. 110-343 authorizes the United States Secretary of the Treasury to spend up to US
$700 billion to purchase distressed assets, especially mortgage-backed securities from the nation's
banks.
2 The federal debt is that amount of money that the United States owes its creditors, domestic and
international. United States Public Debt, WIKPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UnitedStatespublicdebt.
3 See generally Kevin Phillips, BAD MONEY: RECKLESS FINANCE, FAILED POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL
CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (Viking 2008). Mr. Phillips is a political and economic commentator
and a regular contributor to the Los Angles imes and National Public Radio. He is among a growing
number of critics of the "financialization" of the economy, i.e. the increased dominance of the finance
industry in the sum total of economic activity. Id. at 19-21. Mr. Phillips takes this argument further by
alleging that the financial sector sets the economic and political agenda for the country. Id.4 The irony of this highly unusual step is that this would be nationalizing the banks in any other country
but the United States; here the public recapitalization is called "taking a public stake."
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of the presidential election.5 All of this is not good news, however, for
health care reform.
In California, another financial disaster was occurring: a budget
impasse over how to close a $15.2 billion state budget shortfall.
Republicans opposed any new taxes to pay for state programs, while
Democrats supported budget cuts with higher taxes on corporations and the
wealthiest Californians. The impasse lasted an unprecedented three months
and finally ended on September 16, 2008, when Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger signed a compromise budget of $144.5 billion, agreed
upon by the legislative bodies. The budget has $7.1 billion in spending
cuts which neither closes the $15.2 billion shortfall nor provides assistance
for the dislocation and losses of those who depend on state funding and
were without it during the eighty-five day impasse.
Even before the current federal economic disaster, there was hope that
the states, through innovation and experimentation in their multiple
laboratories, would try out different approaches to universal health care
access. And indeed, recently the Kaiser Family Foundation reported that
three states-Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont-have enacted universal
coverage plans, while fourteen more have proposed such initiatives.7 This
report includes states such as California and Illinois where reform
initiatives have been attempted but have ultimately failed. While this may
seem like little success, the fact that the states are working toward universal
coverage is heartening. Unfortunately, with current economic conditions,
there is a real question about whether the federal government will be able
to address national health care reform efforts since, even if there might be
bilateral political support, the financing may not be there. 8
Governor Schwarzenegger, who will be termed out of the governor's
seat in 2010, the end of his current term, had declared 2007 to be the Year
of Health Care Reform. Making health care reform work in California, a
state with a population of 36.5 million, at least 6.5 million uninsured,
would have ensured his legacy as an innovative leader. And if he could
Sen. John McCain, the then-Republican candidate for the presidency and ostensible leader of the GOP,
"suspended" his presidential campaign for a few days during the week of the first presidential debate in
order to be in Washington to participate in negotiations between the administration and the legislature.
He ended up participating in the debate against Sen. Barack Obama.
6 Gov. Schwarzenegger signed the budget without the usual fanfare stating that the budget that was
three months late was nothing to celebrate. "It's three months late because both of the parties stayed in
their ideological corners and refused to come out." Justin Ewers, Schwarzenegger Signs California
Budget, Ending 85-Day Standoff, U.S. NEWS, Sept. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.usnews.conarticles/newslnationaU2008/09/24/schwarzenegger-signs-california-budget-
ending-85-day-standoff.html.
7 KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, STATES MOVING TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE
HEALTH CARE REFORM (2008).
8 Not only is it highly unlikely that there will be federal financing to pay for health care reform, it is also
unlikely that there will be agreement between the parties as to how to implement universality. While
Sen. Barack Obama, the then-Democratic candidate, stated that he would use federal funding to create
universal coverage where it does not currently exist, Sen. John McCain, the then-Republican candidate,
favored consumer directed health care ("CDHC") funded by a $5000-defined contribution to taxpayers
to purchase health insurance in the open market.
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have made inroads into solving the "health care mess" 9 we are currently in,
he would indeed have ensured himself some measure of immortality.
Although the governor's plan was not the only proposal on the table, it was
certainly the most high profile. Not only was it supported by the governor
but it was modeled after the recently enacted Massachusetts health reform
plan. 10
The gravamen of both the Massachusetts and California plans is nearly
universal coverage achieved by means of individual and employer
mandates and the shared responsibility of other key groups such as
providers and governmental organizations, both state and federal. In
California, because the size of the state and population made the task so
much more daunting than in Massachusetts, the governor was counting on
financing from other sources such as an increased tax on tobacco products.
In early 2007, when the governor first introduced the health care reform
bill, the Health Care Security and Cost Reduction Act, the state was
financially flush, operating in a surplus environment. Since that time, the
financial picture has radically changed. California faced a 2008-09 budget
shortfall of $14.5 billion offset by billions in budget cuts." While initially
the ten percent across-the-board cuts to all sectors included a budget
reduction of $1.1 billion to California's thirty-four billion dollar Medicaid
program, in the end the 2008-09 budget cuts affect only Medi-Cal
physician reimbursement.12
Even in the face of a large projected budget shortfall for 2008-09, the
governor continued to move forward with health care reform legislation,
ABX1 1, and to that end submitted a proposed ballot measure, for the
November 2008 statewide ballot, which would establish the funding
mechanism for health care reform.13 However, despite the governor's
support, the support of California Assembly Speaker Nufiez and its passage
in the State Assembly, the plan never came out of the Senate Health
Committee chaired by Senator Sheila Kuehl (D-Santa Monica) who herself
9 This term comes from a relatively new book on health care reform by physician Julius Richmond and
health economist Rashi Fein. JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHi FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: HOW WE
GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT I (Harv. Univ. Press 2005).
1o Jesse McKinley & Kevin Sack, California Senate Panel Rejects Health Coverage Proposal, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29health.html?_r=- I &oref=
slogin/.
The Massachusetts health reform plan became effective on July 1, 2007, so it is too soon to
evaluate its success or failure. The Massachusetts plan seeks almost universal health insurance through
an individual mandate, i.e., a requirement that all residents obtain affordable health insurance. The plan
was motivated in part by a threat from the federal government to eliminate $385 million in federal
Medicaid money unless the state reduced the number of uninsured people. Pam Belluck, Massachusetts
Sets Health Plan for Nearly All, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/05/us/05mass.html?pagewanted= I &_r= I &ei=5094&en=l efda02422
b0267b&hp&ex= I 144296000&partner=homepage.
" Tom Chorneau, Governor's Budget Aims to Curb Spending Mandates, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2008,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-binlarticle.cgi?f=/c/a2008101/l3/MNNCUDQTGDTL&hw=
Governor+Budget+Aims+to+Curb&sn=001&sc=1000. While just two years ago California was flush
with billions of surplus tax dollars, tax revenue has since plummeted as a result of the home mortgage
crisis and a lackluster economy. Id.12 Kevin Yamamura & Jim Sanders, Court Rejects California's Medi-Cal Reimbursement Cuts,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 20, 2008, available at http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/35502.
13 Michael Rothfeld & Jordan Rau, Nuilez Sweetens Deal for Unions, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-health20dec20,l,2651305.story.
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was the sponsor of competing legislation. 14 One of the nails in the coffin of
ABX1 1 was certainly the report of the independent legislative analyst,
Elizabeth Hill, requested late in the day by Senate President Pro Tempore
Don Perata (D-Oakland). Ms. Hill questioned the bill's proponents'
assumption of the cost to the state of subsidized health insurance
premiums, warning that higher subsidies than assumed could place great
financial stresses on the state. 15 Whether the legislation's defeat was due to
politically motivations,16 an unexpectedly large budget shortfall, bad policy,
or excessively high costs is a question that surely will be discussed in
future post-mortems of California's 2007 health care reform.
Health care is a mess in the United States. In 2006, the cost of health
care was $2.1 trillion or sixteen percent of a $13.13 trillion GDP. This
amounts to roughly $7000 for each man, woman, and child. In 2004,
California's health care costs of $169 billion accounted for eleven percent
of the state's economy, proportionally less than both federal spending for
health care and most other states including other states like New York and
Massachusetts with-until the recent fiscal crises-similarly strong
economies.' 7 While private health insurance and consumer out-of-pocket
costs combined account for the majority of health care spending, Medicare
and Medicaid together pay thirty-six percent of health expenditures in
California, 18 yet as many as 6.5 million Californians remain uninsured.
Most of the uninsured population are considered to be the working poor,
i.e. working in a job that either does not offer health insurance or at a price
that this population cannot afford. More than three in five earn less than
200% of the federal poverty level ("FPL"), which in 2006 was $33,200 for
a family of three. 19
One of the more difficult problems presented by an uninsured
population is how to reimburse physicians and hospitals that provide care
to the uninsured. There are a number of ways in which this happens: for
example, Medicaid disproportionate share hospital ("DSH") payments, and
charity care provided by not-for-profit hospitals in exchange for not-for-
profit tax status. In addition, providers often shift the cost of care for the
'4 SB 840 (Keuhl): "Single Payer Health Care Coverage", CALHEALTHREFORM.OR.2 Oct. 24, 2007,
http://www.calhealthreform.org/content/view/21/38/. Senator Kuehl has been sponsoring SB 840, a
competing health insurance reform bill. SB 840 would cover all Californians under a newly created
single-payer California Health Insurance System ("CHIS") which would be funded by a three to four
percent individual income tax and an additional 8.17% employer payroll tax. Id. (link to a summary of
the proposal's features: http://www.calhealthreform.org/content/view/37/38/).
15 See Analyst Raises Possibility of Steep Costs for Health Care Reform, CAL. HEALTHLINE, Jan. 23,
2008, http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2008/l/23/Analyst-Raises-Possibility-of-Steep-Costs-
for-Health-Care-Reform.aspx?topiclD=37. The report indicated that the estimated cost of the health
insurance premium subsidy could be off by as much as fifty dollars, an underestimation that could cause
a shortfall of $1.5 billion in five years. Id.
16 Perata and Nufiez, by many accounts bitter enemies, are also termed out; victims of the failure of
Proposition 93 which would have allowed them more years in the state legislature.
17 While the economies of New York and Massachusetts have been robust in the past few years, New
York is experiencing the same kind of budget shortfall as California due to the sub-prime crisis, a
declining housing market, the moving target stock market, and an impending recession.
18 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., SNAPSHOT: CALIFORNIA ADDENDul-HEALTH CARE COSTS 101 (2006).
19 Office of the Govemor-State of California, Fact Sheet, Top 10 Indicators: California's Health Care
System Is Broken, http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/fact-sheet15064 (citing Peter Harbage & Len M.
Nichols, A Premium Price: The Hidden Costs All Californians Pay in Our Fragmented Health Care
System, NEW AM. FOUND., Dec. 2006).
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uninsured by charging insured Californians more for their health care. In
California, this so-called "hidden tax" is estimated to cost $455 per
individual or $1186 per family per year.20 Other studies seem to indicate
that the impact of uncompensated care for the uninsured is so minimal that
fully paying hospital costs of indigent patients would reduce private payers'
costs by less than one percent. 2' The purpose of the governor's proposal
would be to create a system where almost everyone, including seventy
percent of those who are currently uninsured, are insured, thereby
providing an access pathway so that almost all Californians can get health
care that is reimbursed directly.
Since 1994, when President Clinton's Health Security Act ("HSA"),
which envisioned universal coverage through a market-based managed
competition system, was defeated, there has been relatively little new
health-care reform on the federal front.22 With the exception of the
enactment of SCHIP, the addition of a prescription drug benefit to
Medicare in 1997, and legislation authorizing medical or health security
accounts for not only the private but the public markets, there has been
relatively little momentum toward change to insure everyone through a
single-payer or multiple payer approach. So it has been, to a large extent,
up to the states to go beyond the reach of Medicaid and SCHIP and propose
insurance or other coverage plans in order to create more universal
coverage for their residents as well as improve the functioning of their
health insurance markets.
Massachusetts and California, two very different states, but both with
Republican governors (former Governor Romney (R-MA) and current
Governor Schwarzenegger (R-CA)), are putting or have put all of their
health care reform eggs in a individual mandate basket which is effectively
universal but not single-payer coverage. Massachusetts' plan became
effective on July 1, 2007, while California's health care reform bill, ABX1
1 was defeated in the California Senate's Health Committee23 on January
20 Id.
21 Loren Kaye, Loren Kaye: Finding the Right Health Care Solution, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 17, 2007
at B7, available at http://www.calchamber.com/Chamber in the News/081707_.LKoped_SacBee.htm
treporting on a recent study by the California Foundation for Commerce and Education).
2 See Philip Lee et al., Politics, Health Policy, and the American Character, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
7, 29 (2006) (stating that there has been "little movement toward universal coverage"). While most
health reform experts credit the defeat of the HSA to the complexity of the plan and a "behind closed
doors" approach taken by its primary architects, then First-Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and Chief
Health Care Policy Advisor Ira Magaziner, its defeat was likely a harbinger of the fate of future federal
health care reform. The HSA, like the individual mandate, was a compromise position between a free
market approach and a single-payer approach. Its managed competition approach segmented the
insurance market into community-rated pools offered as a choice to all Americans who were required to
join. The plan was to be funded by a pay-or-play employer mandate. All plans were required to cover
certain basic health care but richer plans were available for richer cost share. Although this plan seemed
to use a relatively free market approach, the amount of government regulation of the insurance industry,
the hardship of the employer mandate on small business, and its regulation of physician choice and
compensation proved more than sufficient to defeat it. See generally Kerry Hughes, Note, Federal
Mandates in the Health Care Context, 4 U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 187, 190-92 (1994) (stating that under the
HSA, the private sector would have control over health care, but would be "closely supervised" by the
,o vernment).
Anthony York, Postmortem Analysis of Health Care Bill, CAPITOL WEEKLY, Jan. 31, 2008, available
at http:l/www.capitolweekly.net/article.php?xid=wvanx2pnrdc8z8. The Senate Health Committee is
chaired by Senator Kuehl (D-Santa Monica) who is sponsoring a single-payer bill, SB 840, which in
2006 was approved by the Legislature and vetoed by the governor. The bill was reintroduced in the
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28, 2007, when it was unable to Farner the six votes needed for it to be put
to a vote of the entire Senate. 4 Before the vote in the Senate Health
Committee, the governor and Assembly Speaker Nuhiez had filed a ballot
initiative with the state attorney general's office that created a $14.4 billion
financing package for the governor's universal individual mandate plan that
would guarantee access to health care for the majority of Californians.25
But with the defeat of ABX 11 in the state Senate, there was no opportunity
to resurrect health care reform in time to put another financing initiative in
front of the voters in 2008.26
The two plans-Massachusetts and California-were structured
similarly, yet one has become law and the other has not. The purpose of this
Article is to examine generally multi-payer individual mandates, explore
the similarities between the Massachusetts and California plans, and
analyze the differences that may have determined their respective fates. The
Article will look as well to the effect of the demise of the individual
mandate in California on state-led health reform. Everyone was looking to
see if it could be done in California before conceding that large-scale health
reform may be a job that can be accomplished realistically only at the
federal level.
With respect to any expensive wholesale reform, the single biggest
problem for states to overcome is the perpetual boom-bust fiscal cycle from
surplus to deficit, and back again, that derails large scale funding on new
programs such as health care reform.27 Because states are required to
balance their budgets and cannot deficit-spend in bust times, there is no
escape route for expensive programs that may require additional revenue.
Further exacerbating the problem is funding that is mandated by state or
federal law. 28 For example, California spends eighty percent of its total
general fund budget on education, health and social services, with
Senate where it passed and is currently languishing on the back burner in the Assembly. The single-
payer bill is avidly supported by the California Nurses Association which lobbied hard in the Senate to
defeat the governor's bill. George Lauer, Will Health Care Reform Come Down to Dueling Ballot
Measures?, CAL. HEALTHLINE, Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.californiahealthline.org/Features/2008/Will-
Health-Care-Reform-Come-Down-to-Dueling-Ballot--Measures.aspx.
24 Tom Chorneau, Troubled Health Care Bill Up for Vote Today, S.F CHRON., Jan. 28, 2008, available
at http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a12008/01l/28/BAFOUMJI1U.DTL. Even before the
vote, four Republican senators and members of the committee and two Democrats, Kuehl and Leland
Yee (D-San Francisco), had said they would not support the bill. Don Perata (D-Oakland), and president
pro tem of the Senate, could have forced the bill out of committee and onto the full Senate floor where
it probably would have failed anyway for lack of sufficient support. "I don't know of any member of
our caucus that is wildly in support of this bill," said Yee. Id.
25 Id. (stating that the health plan would provide health coverage for millions). Under the California
ballot initiative system, the proponents of the initiative must first collect sufficient voter signatures to
qualify the measure for a selected ballot. If the initiative qualifies, it then goes to the voters to decide
on. See California Secretary of State-Elections & Voter Information, Initiative Guide,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/initiative guide.htm.
26 Timm Herdt, Senators Reject Plan to Reform Healthcare, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Jan. 29, 2008,
available at http://www. venturacountystar.com/news/2008/jan/29/senators-reject-plan-to-reform-
healthcare.
27 As we are all beginning to realize, if Congress approves a $770 billion bailout to provide liquidity to
the credit markets, there is unlikely to be federal money for health care reform and perhaps even federal
1 rograms like SCHIP and Medicaid may be at risk.
Department of Finance, Budget FAQs, http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/BUDDOCS/question.htm
(stating that Proposition 98 provides funds for education around forty percent and varies based on the
General Funds tax).
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education's budget representing about fifty percent. Three-fourths of
general fund state operations are earmarked for 2just four areas: The
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,2  debt service the
University of California, and the California State University System. With
such a major part of the budget already committed, it is understandably
difficult to get an expensive and new, albeit essential, program off the
ground.
Furthermore, California's revenue raising options are few; it cannot,
like the federal government, either deficit spend or print money.31 Personal
income taxes are the largest single revenue source, accounting for fifty-four
percent of general fund revenues. In the 1960s, general fund revenues were
funded in much larger part by sales and use taxes. The current reduced
share for the sales tax reflects, in part, the increase in spending on services
which generally are not taxed. The current increased share for personal
income taxes reflects growth in real incomes, the state's progressive tax
structure, and increased capital gains.32 While growth in real income is a
good thing, it is subject to the vagaries of the economy and in "bad"
economic times, personal income declines as does its tax revenue. The
decline in the housing market, due in large part to the subprime mortgage
crisis, has contributed to further losses in revenue. 33 Given such limited
revenue-raising measures, the only options for California in a bust time is
to raise taxes and/or trim expenses, the latter of which is what the
governor's 2008-09 budget has proposed.34 Unfortunately for Governor
Schwarzenegger, the projected budget deficit for 2008 and 2009 must seem
like back to the future 2003 when a budget deficit precipitated by the loss
of revenue due to the dot-com industry failure and exacerbated by higher
electricity costs35 derailed the Gray Davis administration.
36
29 Included in the Department of Corrections budget is health care for prisoners who are constitutionally
entitled to state-provided health care while incarcerated. Currently, the California state prison health
care system has been, by court order, taken over by a receiver who is administering the program, the
costs of which are still undetermined.
30 Legislative Analyst's Office, Cal Facts 2006: California's Economy and Budget in Perspective, State
Budget, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2006cal-facts/2006_calfacts-budget.htm.
3' Posting of Alan Katz to The Alan Katz Health Care Reform Blog,
http://alankatz.wordpress.com/2008/01/28/some-lessons-learned-from-californias-year-of-health-care-
reform (Jan. 28, 2008).
32 Legislative Analyst's Office, Cal Facts 2000: California's Economy and Budget in Perspective, State
Budget, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2000/calfacts/2000 calfactsstate.budget.html.
33 Abby Goodnough, Housing Slump Pinches States in Pocketbook, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, available
at http://www.nytimes.con2007/04/08/us/08housing.html?pagewanted=l &n=Top/Classifieds/Real%20
Estate/Locations/Florida&_r=-l.
34 Governor Defends Health Care Plan in Face of Budget Shortfall, CAL. HEALTHLINE, Nov. 12, 2007,
http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2007/11/12/Governor-Defends-Health-Care-Plan-in-Face-
of-Budget-Shortfall.aspx?topiclD=93.
35 California Energy Crisis, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California electricity-crisis (last
visited May 1, 2009). The California electricity crisis stemmed from a combination of factors including
an incomplete deregulation scheme, a passive FERC, and predatory schemes by electricity wholesalers
such as Enron. Id.
36 Gray Davis, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Gray-Davis (last visited May 1, 2009).
Governor Gray Davis (1999-2003) was the first governor in the history of California to be successfully
recalled under California law that permits special recall elections. While other governors such as Pete
Wilson, Ronald Reagan and Jerry Brown had all faced recall attempts, none had been successful. Id.
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II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
Let us begin by analyzing insurance mandates. Individual mandates
seek to compel people to obtain health insurance that they would not
otherwise voluntarily purchase; employer mandates seek to compel
employers to provide health insurance to their employees or pay into a state
insurance pool that would provide individual health insurance policies to
individuals who do not have access to group plans through employment or
public programs. A good first question is, why compel participation? First,
compelling universal participation in insurance guards against the effects of
adverse selection. Adverse selection is the insurance phenomenon that
occurs in voluntary programs when the older, sicker, and high demand
population enroll in the insurance pool and younger, healthier and low
demand individuals do not, thereby driving up the cost of health care and
health insurance premiums and often resulting in making insurance
unaffordable for the less well-off enrollees. There is evidence that people
who are voluntarily uninsured make that decision in part to take advantage
of more expensive safety-net health care services when they become ill
again, unnecessarily driving up the cost of health care.37 Second, for
individuals who are eligible for public insurance programs but are not
enrolled, individual mandates may force this group to finally enroll in the
public program for which they are eligible. Third, mandates that require
employers to "pay or play" force employers to participate in paying their
fair share for health insurance instead of relying on public programs,38
although it is arguable that perhaps health care costs ought not be borne by
employers.39 In addition, employer mandates are subject to the challenge
that they violate ERISA which prohibits states from regulating health
insurance plans.
To whom are individual mandates attractive? Without serious low-
income products and subsidies, individual mandates are not particularly
attractive to the uninsured 0 For the low and even middle income
uninsured with a demand for health insurance, the key issue is
affordability.4 1 Unless health insurance is really affordable, there is little
37 LeAnne DeFrancesco, Safety Net "'Crowding Out" Private Health Insurance for Childless Adults,
ACADEMYHEALTH, June 2004, at 1, http://www.hcfo.net/pdf/findings0604.pdf.38 Sherry A. Glied et al., Consider It Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1612 (2007), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/26/6/1612.
39 See generally ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS,
DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (Alfred A. Knopf 2007).40 Katherine Swartz, Address at the Getting to Universal Health Insurance Coverage Conference: How
Should We Balance Affordable and Comprehensive Coverage? (Jan. 31, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.kaisemetwork.org/health-cast/uploaded-files/013108-nasi-session3_transcript.pdf). Of the
45-50 million Americans who are uninsured, approximately 50-70% are low-income who cannot afford
to buy insurance particularly in the individual market with some kind of a subsidy. Id.
4' See Posting of Rick Kronick to Health Affairs Blog, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2008/03/06/the-
mandate-wars-in-california-and-beyond (Mar. 6, 2008, 12:08 EST). A major issue of all health
insurance is affordability and so all serious health access reform must include low-income subsidies that
make insurance affordable for lower income folks. This is particularly true when the health reform
includes a mandate for individuals to be covered. How the subsidy is structured matters as well. When
the individual's contribution is fixed as a proportion of income with the public subsidy bearing the
remainder of cost, the risk of a rise in the cost of health insurance is allocated to the public entity paying
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incentive for this population, who Professor Brad Herring calls "rational"
free riders,42 to purchase health insurance as an alternative to the safety net
that is already available in the form of hospital emergency departments that
are required to provide charity care.43 As for the cohort who simply chooses
not to have health insurance, the group that health economist Mark Pauly
calls "irrational buyers," those are the people who will not sign up for
insurance even if it were free, and certainly not if they have to pay for it.
44
So if mandated insurance is not attractive, for a variety of reasons, to
the uninsured, why has this model become the health care reform du jour? I
believe reformers have latched onto the individual mandate model because
the status quo is untenable and unsustainable. Government-sponsored
single-payer universal health insurance has had literally no traction,45 and
we therefore have to do something. As Pauly commented, whatever his
own ultimate goal with respect to health care in the United States is, he is
currently of the "for Pete's sake, let's do something" school of political
science when it comes to seriously reducing the number of people without
health insurance. 46 In defense of individual mandates, Professor Russell
Korobkin explained that mandates are a "concession to constituencies that
otherwise might favor the status quo against attempts to make insurance
more affordable. 47 Drawing an analogy to automobile insurance, Korobkin
argued that mandates are good for people who might be hit by an uninsured
motorist but are not welcomed by the uninsured who don't have insurance
because they feel they cannot afford it. Similarly, health insurance
mandates are good for insured individuals, employers, and private insurers
because the cost of subsidies for the unhealthy and poor uninsured is
partially offset by health insurance premiums paid by the healthy uninsured
who are required to purchase health insurance.48
Not surprisingly, health insurance mandates are an important factor not
only in state health care reform but also potentially at the federal level. In
the Democratic presidential primaries, the individual mandate was almost
the only difference between Hillary Clinton's and Barack Obama's plans to
get to universal health insurance. While Senator Clinton proposed an
individual mandate as her immediate path to universal coverage, Senator
Obama said that he would take that path only if after other reforms and
low-income subsidies, healthy "free riders" still do not buy coverage.
49
for the subsidy and not to the individual. While this design insures affordability by the individual, it
puts the governmental entity at risk of having underfunded the insurance. See id.
2 Mark Pauly, Address at the Getting to Universal Health Insurance Coverage Conference: Can an
Individual Mandate Promote Individual Responsibility? (Feb. 1, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health-cast/uploaded files/020108_nasi part%20IVjtranscript.pdf).
13 See Len M. Nichols & Peter Harbage, Estimating the "Hidden Tax" on Insured Californians Due to
the Care Needed and Received by the Uninsured, NEW AM. FOUND., May 21, 2007,
http://www.newamerica.net/files/052107health-policy-memo.pdf [hereinafter Hidden Tax].
44 Pauly, supra note 42, at 6.
45 See generally Susan Adler Channick, Come the Revolution: Are We Finally Ready For Universal
Health Insurance?, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 303 (2003).
46 See Pauly, supra note 42, at 3.
47 Posting of Russell Korobkin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.composts/1204061613.shtml
tFeb. 26, 2008, 16:33 EST).8 id.
49 Id. Professor Russell Kobobkin, who was a supporter of Sen. Obama and the individual mandate,
notes that compliance, a key component of a mandate, has been unsuccessful both in the automobile
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Korobkin criticizes Clinton's universal mandate as destined for failure
because it fails to specify its own enforcement mechanism without which
the uninsured, particularly voluntary free riders, will have no incentive to
enroll.50
Another important issue of health insurance reform is deciding where
the burden of its cost should fall. Since the mid-twentieth century, the cost
of much health insurance has been paid for by employers who have been
incentivized to offer it as an employment benefit because of generous
federal income tax subsidies. The problem, acknowledged almost
universally, with employment sponsored insurance ("ESI") is that its cost is
almost certainly shifted to employees in the form of lower compensation.
This phenomenon is particularly true in recent decades when the cost of
health care and therefore health insurance has consistently outpaced growth
in Gross Domestic Product ("GDP").5' In recent years, the cost of health
insurance has become so onerous to corporate America that more of its
costs have been directly shifted to employees. The argument in favor of
individual mandates goes something like this: since the cost of ESI,
including mandated employer insurance, is borne in the main by employees
in the form of lost wages, the individual mandate only makes transparent• 52
what is actually happening. As health economist Pauly says, "I think it's
important that citizens know who's paying for what, and it can be terribly
confusing to think that the boss is paying for it."53
In thinking about health care reform, we should be asking what is
compelling enough about creating pathways to universal access to support
an individual mandate approach. Surely basic health care is at the core of a
decent life but so are many other necessities such as a decent income,
decent housing, and decent education which we do not guarantee to every
American.54 What makes health care reform so much more compelling? I
would posit that what is really compelling about health care is its cost, both
absolute and relative to both the past and other budget sectors, as well as
the historical insurance model that has third-parties paying for premiums
55
that are subsidized, in large part, by the federal government. While this
system, an artifact of post-WWII wage freezes,56 has worked well in the
past, the continuing rise in health care costs makes it difficult to sustain.
Because health care costs are outpacing GDP growth as well as the growth
insurance and the health insurance realms. In California, fully twenty-five percent of drivers are
uninsured while in Massachusetts, twenty percent of state residents remain uninsured. Id.50 Id.
5' See generally CONG BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING
(Nov. 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/l 1-13-LT-Health.pdf [hereinafter
CBO].
52 Pauly, supra note 42, at 9.53 Id.
54 Angus Deaton, Policy Implications of the Gradient of Health and Wealth, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 13
(2002), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/21/2/13.pdf. There is increasing
agreement and literature on what is known as the health/wealth gradient, i.e. the close inverse
correlation between health and wealth. As explained by Angus Deaton, professor of economics and
international affairs at Princeton University, "[tihe relationship between health and income is referred to
as a gradient to emphasize the gradual relationship between the two; health improves with income
throughout the income distribution and poverty has more than a threshold effect on health." Id.
55 But see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
56 RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 9.
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of the aging population, they will inevitably adversely affect the ability of
Americans to make other consumption choices unless steps are taken to
reduce them.57
It is widely accepted that people without access to health care raise its
costs both because they are sicker by the time they are able to access health
care and because they receive their care in the most expensive and
uncoordinated venues possible.58 It is also widely accepted that people with
multiple chronic diseases create the greatest financial burden on the health
care system resulting in a highly skewed distribution of health care costs.
59
While this phenomenon may be less preventable in the aging population, it
is certainly much more preventable in younger cohorts whose burden of
disease is a result of lack of access to health care rather than aging. In
addition to the economic issue and part of the health wealth gradient, the
Institute of Medicine 6° and more recently Families USA6 1 have found an
increased number of deaths among the uninsured that is directly linked to
uninsurance. Families USA reported that in 2006, twice as many people
died from lack of health insurance than from homicide.62 Among working
Americans with access to health insurance, one of their greatest fears is the
loss of their employer-sponsored health insurance, even though that benefit
is neither guaranteed by law nor likely to be as generous as in the past.
Working America is terrified of health problems and interventions that they
would not be able to afford but for their ESI.63 The irony of job lock that
occurs when working Americans stay in jobs until they are eligible for
Medicare has not been lost on many. That America's only true social health
insurance64 is the health access safety net for millions, while universal
health insurance, which could take the form of an expanded Medicare,
65
57 CBO, supra note 5 1. One of the newer movements in health care research is generating data on the
comparative effectiveness of various treatment modalities to help providers make better, i.e. more
economically efficient, treatment choices without giving up efficacy. Id.
58 Peter Harbage & Len M. Nichols, Coverage Without Gaps: Implementing Seamless Health Coverage
in California, NEW AM. FOUND., Sept. 2007, available at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/HPSeamCov.pdf.
59 Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care Expenditures, RES. IN ACTION, June
2006, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/rial9/expendria.pdf
60 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: Too LITTLE, Too LATE (Nat'l Acad. Press
2002). The IOM report estimates that 18,000 adults between the ages of twenty-five (the age young
adults are no longer covered by their parents' health insurance) and sixty-four (the year before Medicare
eligibility) died in the year 2000 because they did not have health insurance.
61 FAMILIES USA, DYING FOR COVERAGE IN CALIFORNIA (Apr. 2008),
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/dying-for-coverage/califomia.pdf. Families USA reported that in
California alone, 3100 working-age or eight daily Californians died from lack of health insurance in
2006.
62 id.
63 See Michelle M. Doty et al., Seeing Red: Americans Driven into Debt by Medical Bills, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, August 2005, available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usrdoc/837-Doty-seeing-red-medical-debt.pdf. There is ample
evidence available to demonstrate that health care expenses are the main cause of personal bankruptcies
in the United States. See id.
64 Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 287
(1993). Social insurance is insurance where the insured's contribution such as a premium is delinked
from her usage. Medicare, for example, provides beneficiaries with whatever health care usage is
individually necessary within the coverage limits with no effect on cost. On the other hand, the cost of
individual health insurance is usually determined actuarially, i.e. linked to usage; the higher the usage,
the costlier the insurance. Id.
65 Jacob Hacker, health policy and Medicare expert at Yale University, who has written prolifically on
Medicare for twenty-five years, is proposing bringing virtually everyone under the umbrella of either
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continues to be a complete non-starter, is a strange outcome indeed even in
the United States.
ll. CAN HEALTH CARE REFORM HAPPEN IN THE STATES
ALONE? THE MASSACHUSETTS AND CALIFORNIA
EXPERIENCES
The myriad problems of uninsurance notwithstanding, we have not yet
resolved the issues-economic, cultural, political, policy-that are crucial
to a solution acceptable to the majority necessary to pass such legislation.
As stated earlier in this Article, the individual mandate is a compromise
that does not represent the preferences of either political party but seems to
be less offensive than other alternatives. 66 Although the individual mandate
for health insurance is in effect in Massachusetts, it is too soon to know
whether it is going to be viable on a longer-term or broader basis.
Furthermore, even if Massachusetts succeeds, is its model replicable by
other states? The experience in California seems to suggest that, while the
defeat of the individual mandate has been attributed both to political
divisiveness 67 and budgetary woes, 68 it was not a solution that either party
in the legislature was really passionate about. The Republicans were
opposed because there was too much government presence and the
Democrats were opposed because there was not enough. 69 The only real
passion for reform modeled on a personal responsibility philosophy came
from the governor and, in the end, it was not enough.
There are, however, some real issues raised by California's and
Massachusetts' experiences. One is whether, when it comes to wholesale
health care reform, the states can go it alone. In Massachusetts, the number
qualified ESI or an expanded Medicare ("Health Care for America") for all those who do not have ESI.
Employers would be required to pay or play. Individuals who are covered under HCA can essentially
choose, as can Medicare beneficiaries, the fee-for-service option or a private managed care option. THE
LEWIN GROUP, COST IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE "HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICA" PROPOSAL (2008),
available at http://www.sharedprosperity.org/hcfa/lewin.pdf.66 See id. at 4. Republicans, who were represented by the last administration and the then-presidential
nominee, Senator John McCain, favor using private market solutions such as the Health Savings
Account ("HAS") and association purchasing pools. Democrats, on the other hand, are more likely to
support universal single-payer insurance or a combination of ESI and expanded single-payer insurance
for those not covered by ESI.67 Daniel Weintraub, The Death of Health Care Reform: How Arnold Schwarzenegger's Overhaul Plan
Was Doomed by the Legislature's Liberal-Conservative Partisan Crossfire, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 10,
2008, at E4 [hereinafter Weintraub, Death of Health Care Reform]. ABXI I was championed by both
the governor and Fabian Nuiiez, the democratic speaker of the California Assembly. It was opposed by
most members of the democratic California Senate including the leader of the Senate, Don Perata, and
the powerful chair of the Senate Health Committee, Sheila Kuehl, who has been championing a single-
payer universal health insurance bill. Id.
8York, supra note 23 (stating that the Senate Health Committee defeated the plan because of the $14.5
billion deficit). In the midst of the individual mandate campaign, the state, which had been experiencing
a budget surplus under the Schwarzenegger administration, was caught short by various circumstances
that resulted in a severe revenue shortfall. Marty D. Omoto, Next Year's California Budget Deficit of
$10 Billion and the Most Vulnerable in Our State, CAL. PROGRESS REP., Nov. 15, 2007,
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2007/l l/next.yearscali.htm. In addition, the report of the
Legislative Analyst's Office opining that a small premium assumption gap could result in a large
budgetary shortfall was at least cover that senators voting against the bill could use to rationalize their
opposition. York, supra note 23.6 Daniel Weintraub, Autopsy: Who Killed California's Health Care Reform?, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 22,
2008.
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of people who were uninsured was small compared to California, and the
ideological and financial infrastructure of health insurance reform was
already in place. In contrast, California has a large pool of uninsured
persons, somewhere between 4 and 6.5 million, and an unregulated
individual insurance market. Since the individual mandate depends, in large
part, on affordable individual policies with reasonable coverage and
guaranteed access for people who do not have access to a group market,7 °
reforming the individual market would have been much more onerous in
California than in Massachusetts.7' In addition, Massachusetts was able to
budget an additional $500 to $600 million from its already-existing state
free-care pool which was set up to reimburse hospitals for providing care to
the uninsured.72 California, on the other hand, does not have such a pool of
money and much of the otherwise uncompensated hospital care is paid for
through a so-called "hidden tax" on the insured.73 Under ABX 1 1, the
additional revenue available to hospitals from the no-longer necessary tax
would have been used by hospitals to satisfy their allocation to the
individual mandate.74
Even in Massachusetts, with its seemingly smaller pool of uninsured,
its more highly regulated insurance market, its larger pools of federal and
state funds already earmarked for health care purposes, and its culture of
greater social solidarity, the going is tough. One reason is that the number
of uninsured may have been badly underestimated-650,000, not 400,000.
A second and related reason is that the cost of low-income premium
subsidies is higher than first estimated. Massachusetts had budgeted $472
million for the current fiscal year but will need an additional appropriation
of $150 million to meet its needs; this underfunding is estimated to
continue into future years. Exacerbating the problem of insufficient funds is
a loss of revenue from expected sources such as the state's free-care pool
which paid hospitals to treat the poor and insufficient funds from the less
than adequate employers' mandate.75 The only way that health reform
Massachusetts-style was sold to the legislature and the voters was to make
the cost fit the budget,76 something that could not be done in California for
a number of reasons, many of which have already been discussed.
California legislators were already skeptical and barely on board with the
individual mandate when state coffers were flush; when the real numbers
70 The individual mandate is meant to provide universal coverage by supplementing already existing
roup markets such as ESI, Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP.
Posting of Rick Curtis & Ed Neuschler to Health Affairs Blog,
http://healthaffairs.orgfblogl2008/03/05/califomias-shelved-health-care-reform (Mar. 5, 2008, 15:04
EST). Massachusetts was able to bring the cost of individual policies down by merging its existing
individual market with its less expensive small group market and then requiring everyone to purchase
coverage in order to deal with adverse selection. In California, where individual policies are actuarially
underwritten and there is no guaranteed issue, the task of creating an affordable individual market with
decent coverage would have been much more difficult. Id.72 Trudy Lieberman, Cautionary Healthcare Tales from California and Massachusetts, THE NATION,
Mar. 25, 2008, available at http:l/www.thenation.com/doc/20080407/lieberman.
73 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
74 Posting of Lucien Wulsin to Health Affairs Blog, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/200803/06/california-
negotiating-the-intersections-of-reform/ (Mar. 6, 2008, 12:27 EST).75 Lieberman, supra note 72.76
id.
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started to come in and the economy took a serious downturn, all except the
hardiest supporters quickly jumped ship.
Integral to the question of whether it is possible for the states to
effectively reform health care on their own is the issue of cost. Cost is both
an independent and a dependent variable of health care and it is always the
Achilles heel of health care reform77 The more independent issue of cost is
how much of the budget we are willing and can agree to allocate to health
care. The United States currently spends $2.1 trillion or in excess of sixteen
percent of GDP on health care, and California spends $146 billion or eleven
percent of its available revenue, yet 46 million Americans and 6.5 million
Californians are uninsured. These numbers are not accidental; they are the
result of ideological beliefs that lead to policy decisions as to how we wish
to provide access to health care in this country.
On the other hand, cost as a dependent variable relates to affordability,
i.e. the cost of the current regime versus the cost of the regime that we
aspire to. Universal coverage almost always includes explicit governmental
subsidization for low-income populations that are not eligible for already
existing public insurance in order to create affordable insurance with
meaningful coverage. Revenue can come from already existing sources or
new sources, usually taxes on personal income, and/or on revenue from the
various players in the health care arena. For example, Massachusetts
reallocated federal Medicaid money targeted for uncompensated hospital
care and California's plan taxed hospitals and cigarettes to pay for health
reform costs.
78
As the legislative effort played out in California, finding new sources
of revenue was difficult, more difficult than reallocating already existing
revenue.79 When it became clear that physician providers would not be
financial players in health reform, Schwarzenegger made a last ditch effort
to secure financing by imposing an additional tax of $1.75 per pack on
cigarettes, a tax that would have been not only regressive but also
inconsistent with the state's aggressive anti-smoking public health
campaign. In addition to the state's real problem of finding additional
revenue, it is impossible to underestimate the political influence of heavily
funded special interests such as the tobacco and the insurance industries.
One of the governor's health care experts, Daniel Zingale, has indicated
that the bill's demise was due in large part to powerful groups whose
economic interests were not in alignment. "There's nothing new about a
panel of legislators voting down health care reform under intense lobbying
77 Stephen L. Isaacs & Steven A. Schroeder, California Dreamin '--State Health Care Reform and the
Prospect for National Change, 358 NEW EN. J. MED. 1537 (2008).
78 HEALTH ACCESS ANALYSIS, HEALTH REFORM IN CALIFORNIA & MASSACHUSETTS: DIFFERENT FROM
START TO FINISH (Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.health-access.org/advocating/docs/2008CA-
MAReformComparison%2001%2014%2008.pdf.
79 See Weintraub, Death of Health Care Reform, supra note 67. At least some of the reason why
Elizabeth Hill, the California independent Legislative Analyst, objected to the financing piece of ABXI
I was a last-ditch attempt by its proponents to bridge the financing gap with an additional tobacco tax
which Hill warned would likely wane in the future and leave the state with an additional budget item it
could not cover. Id.
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from special interests-tobacco, Blue Cross, whoever else was active over
there," Zingale said.8°
Notwithstanding the revenue raising difficulties, it is possible that the
additional funding might have been offset by savings from the efficiencies
of a more universal system. Assuming that the state could have found
additional revenue to fund low-income subsidies,81 universal coverage
could have provided some savings particularly with respect to
uncompensated care, the so-called "hidden tax" on the insured by insurers
to pay for the otherwise uncompensated care of the un- and underinsured.82
The amount of this tax on insured individuals has been estimated to be as
high as ten percent. This cost savings does not include savings that would
have been realized by the state which itself subsidizes uncompensated care
in an unknown amount but within the range of $1.783 to $3.6 billions4 in
2005. Whether such savings would have actually offset the cost of
universal health coverage is, of course, still untested and unknown. What is
known is that, no matter the potential for savings in dollars and lives, no
matter the aspiration, the projected cost of ABX1 1 was simply too much
for California to afford in a declining economy. 85
An equally perplexing question relating to cost as an independent
variable is not so much what we must spend for a particular program, but
the struggle for how to resolve the more philosophical questions upon
which good, majoritarian policy depends. With regard to health care, it is a
question of how much of our revenue, our gross domestic product, we are
willing to allocate to health care in light of so many other societal and
individual needs. The independent question of cost should be contrasted
with the dependent question of how much we must spend to achieve almost
universal coverage through, for example, an individual mandate in
California. Clearly the answers to both questions of cost involve more than
just a consideration of dollars. In the case of California's recently failed
health reform, the ideology of almost universal access must be
distinguished from the predominantly private market solution which would
have relied almost exclusively on the players-individuals, employers,
insurers, providers, and the tobacco industry-to finance the reform. The
state's piece-heavy subsidization beyond its preexisting obligations-
80 York, supra note 23.
81 Id. While in Massachusetts, some funding for health care reform was budgeted from the state's
general fund, California's ABXI I was crafted to be budget-neutral, i.e. with no impact on the general
fund without legislative approval. See id.
82 Hidden Tax, supra note 43.
83 GERALD F. KoMINSKI ET AL., UCLACTR. FOR HEALTH POL'Y RES., COST OF INSURING CALIFORNIA'S
UNINSURED (2005), http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/Costoflnsuring-PB-052405.pdf.
84 FAMILIES USA, PAYING A PREMIUM: THE ADDED COST OF CARE FOR THE UNINSURED (June 2005),
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Paying-a-Premiumrev-July-1373 le.pdf.
85 See Daniel Weintraub, Get California Off Its Financial Roller Coaster, MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 12,
2008, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_8542737. Both the governor and the
independent Legislative analyst have proposals for getting California off of its financial roller coaster.
The governor's proposal looks more to limiting spending and making budget cuts automatic in bad
times while the Legislative analyst's proposal focuses on setting aside tax receipts that come in above
projected levels for the year rather than use the surplus to push spending up automatically as required
by mandates previously adopted by the voters. Id.
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relied exclusively on the projected contributions of the players beyond
which the state was neither willing nor able to contribute.
It has become apparent that the absolute cost of health care cannot be
sustained at its current level. The growth in health care costs is well
documented and is attributable to many factors, such as expensive new
technology, third-party first-dollar health insurance that contributes to
patient and provider demand, labor costs, and provider reimbursement
schemes. In the United States, the $2.1 trillion cost of health care means
that we are spending $7000 annually for each man, woman and child,
substantially more than any of the other OECD 87 countries, and with, in
many cases, much poorer outcomes. At this time, health care spending is
the single biggest sector of the economy, larger even than the defense
sector. An early 2007 report from the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities demonstrates that if current fiscal policies-including Medicare
and Medicaid spending and tax revenue losses from tax cuts and changes to
the alternative minimum tax-continue, budget deficits will climb from a
sustainable two percent of GDP to twenty percent of GDP in 2050.89 At that
rate, debt service on the national debt will consume more than half of
federal revenues, making growth impossible. 90 The Congressional Budget
Office's December 2007 projection of health care costs suggest that in the
absence of changes in federal law, total spending on health care would rise
from the current sixteen percent of GDP to twenty-five percent in 2025,
thirty-seven percent in 2050, and forty-nine percent in 2082.91 If these
projections sound alarming, that is because they are certainly meant to be.
Because of the continued rise of health care costs in the United States,
there is now sustained pressure at many levels to implement changes that
will contain costs as a necessary component of health care reform.
Certainly an unaffordable projected cost of $14 billion or more in the
context of a steeply declining economy was central to the defeat of ABX1
1.92 A reasonable cost is therefore essential to the successful design of
reform proposals which seek affordable sustainable health insurance with
reasonable coverage. Even without reform, cost containment is essential to
access for an increasing number of people who become uninsured because
they or their employers cannot afford the cost of decent health insurance.
93
86 National Coalition on Health Care, Health Insurance Costs, http://www.nchc.org/facts/cost.shtml.
87 OECD, http://www.oecd.org/home (last visited May 1, 2009). The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development compares all first-world countries on health care costs and outcomes. Id.
88 RICHARD KOGAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, FEDERAL SPENDING, 2001 THROUGH 2008:
DEFENSE IS A RAPIDLY GROWING SHARE OF THE BUDGET WHILE DOMESTIC APPROPRIATIONS HAVE
SHRUNK (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-5-08bud.pdf. As of the 2008 report, defense
saending consumed 5.6% of GDP. Id.
CHARD KOGAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, THE LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK
Is BLEAK: RESTORING FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY WILL REQUIRE MAJOR CHANGES TO PROGRAMS,
REVENUES, AND THE NATION'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.cbpp.org/l-29-
07bud.pdf.90 Id.
91 CBO, supra note 51.
92 Ed Mendel, State Budget '$20 billion out of whack': Schwarzenegger's Latest Estimate Covers Two
Years, UNION TRIBUNE, Apr. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20080429-9999-1 n29budget.html.
93 Controlling Costs, ASCLEPIOS, Feb. 7, 2008,
http://www.medicarerights.org/issues-actionstasclepios/2008_06.html.
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Recent studies tell us that the primary drivers of personal health care
spending growth are medical prices and utilization. The paradox of modern
health care is that while the technology is available to enhance the quality
and extend the duration of life, it is so costly that it will, if used without
constraint, bankrupt the government, exactly the scenario described
above.94 The second driver of health care costs, utilization, looks to patients
and providers, the consumers of health care, and our third-party payment
system which makes the consumer indifferent to the cost of care, the moral
hazard theory. One perspective of high usage posits that utilization is driven
by demand of the well-insured "nervous well" who demand and receive
high-cost diagnostic tests without regard to their effectiveness. 95 This
perspective also includes overly-cautious providers practicing defensive
medicine, and reimbursement schemes that incentivize high-cost
behaviors.96 A second perspective argues that health care expenditures are
not spread evenly among the population but are highly skewed with a
relatively small percentage of individuals consuming a disproportionately
large share of health care resources and therefore is responsible for a
disproportionate share of health care expenditures.
97
Health care usage data demonstrates that the skewed distribution
perspective seems to be true and that the numbers are sustainable over long
periods of time. There is much agreement that the distribution of health
care costs is highly skewed, with one percent of the population accounting
for twenty-eight percent of health care costs, five percent for more than
half, and ten percent for a full two-thirds.98 The corollary is fascinating as
well: more than fifty percent of the population consumes only three percent
of health care resources. 99 If these data are correct, it makes sense to focus
cost containment research on these expensive populations where the
possibility for improvement is substantially greater. A recent study by the
Commonwealth Fund on options for achieving savings and improving
value in U.S. health care spending suggests that aligning Medicare payment
incentives to more coordinated care alone could save $425 billion over ten
years. °°
94 HENRY J. AARON ET AL., CAN WE SAY NO? THE CHALLENGE OF RATIONING HEALTH CARE
tBrookings Inst. Press 2005).
5 Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, Revisited, 20
HEALTH AFFAIRS 9 (2001) available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/20/2/9.pdf.
96 Recently, I heard stories from two unrelated friends whose elderly and well-insured parents were
hospitalized by their physicians because of acute conditions. In one case, the parent, who had long been
diagnosed with a slow-moving terminal illness, fell and was admitted to a hospital which did extensive
and expensive testing revealing nothing more than what was already known. The testing stopped and he
was released only when his daughter, a nurse, insisted. I am not suggesting that physicians who admit
patients to hospitals are solely financially motivated but I do believe that current financial incentives
may operate to skew professional judgment.
97 Berk & Monheit, supra note 95.
98 Id.
99 Id. The data show that the bottom fifty percent incurred an average annual expenditure of $122 while
those in the top one percent spent $56,459 per person per year. Id.
100 Cathy Schoen et al., Bending the Curve: Options for Achieving Savings and Improving Value in U.S.
Health Spending, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, Dec. 2007, available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doc/EMBARGOED-FULLREPORT-Bending-theCurve-op
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Finally, the last issue raised by the California and Massachusetts state
health reform attempts is whether universal health coverage is best solved
by greatly expanding the market in individual health insurance policies
using a much more heavily regulated private insurance sector. In
California, one of the biggest obstacles to the individual mandate was the
objection by Blue Cross to proposed state regulation of the private
insurance market in order to guarantee issue and keep the cost of individual
policies affordable and coverage sufficiently comprehensive.'0 2 Other
options for getting to universal health coverage have been floated,
including single-payer national health insurance and a system that would
cover all Americans by expanding and building on the already-existing
health insurance infrastructure of Medicare and employment-based
insurance. Single-payer insurance has been raised repeatedly at both the
federal 103  and state 04 levels but has never received much political
traction. 1° Recently, Jacob S. Hacker' °6 has proposed Health Care for
America ("HCA"), a proposal for guaranteed affordable health care for all
Americans building on Medicare and employment-based insurance.
1°7
Professor Hacker's proposal is like the individual mandate in its structure
that builds on already existing and successful programs. Its design
demonstrates the drafters' understanding that in order for health care reform
to be politically successful, it must defer to the eighty-five percent of the
population who are currently insured and want to retain their insurance
coverage. Unlike the individual mandate, HCA would not achieve universal
access through expanding the individual insurance market but would
establish a new public insurance pool modeled after Medicare and financed
through an employer pay-or-play regime.
The advantages of large insurance risk pools as opposed to fragmented
risks have been explored by this author and many others. 108 As Professor
101 See York, supra note 23.
102 Pauly, supra note 42.
103 See Physicians for a National Health Program, Single-Payer National Health Insurance,
http://www.pnhp.org/facts/single .payer-resources.php. Physicians for a National Health Program have
long been advocating for a single-payer national health insurance system where the federal government
organizes the health financing but the delivery remains largely private. This group argues that changing
health care financing to government as a single-payer compared with our current system of multiple
private insurers could save as much as $350 billion annually, enough to provide comprehensive
coverage to all Americans. While this may be very good policy, it is so politically unfeasible that such a
national proposal has never come out of a legislative committee. Id.
04 Kevin Uhrich, Universal Health Care: Is Senate Bill 840 Too Good to Be True?, PASADENA WEEKLY,
Feb. 23, 2006, http://www.pasadenaweekly.com/cms/story/detaiU?id=3031&IssueNum=8. California
State Senator Sheila Kuehl has a state single-payer bill, SB 840, which has passed the state Senate but
has been languishing in the Assembly. After the recent defeat of the governor's individual mandate
universal health insurance bill, SB 840 may be revived. See id.
'05 Single-payer universal health insurance has never received traction in the United States because it is
viewed not as social insurance but rather as socialism. Query whether the recent direct infusion of
capital into major banks to ease the credit crisis which seems to be acceptable to even conservative
Americans might grease the wheels of government-financed universal health insurance.
106 Professor of political science and resident fellow of the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale
University, and a fellow at the New American Foundation.
http://www.yale.edu/polisci/people/jhacker.html.
107 Jacob S. Hacker, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #180: Health Care for America: A
Proposal for Guaranteed, Affordable Health Care for All Americans Building on Medicare and
Employment-Based Insurance (Jan. 1I, 2007), available at
http://www.sharedprosperity.orgfbpl80/bpl80.pdf.108 Stone, supra note 64.
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Hacker described, while HCA is not single-payer universal health
insurance, it does embody many of its values, particularly "the time-tested
idea of social insurance, the notion that major financial risks should be
pooled as widely as possible across rich and poor, healthy and sick, young
and old. Health Care for America would create a large publicly overseen
insurance pool that would bargain for lower prices, capitalize on the vast
administrative efficiencies of a single insurer, and use its reach and
purchasing power to spearhead improvements in the quality and cost-
effectiveness of medical care.' °9 Hacker's proposal has the added
advantage of building on a familiar, time-tested and well-accepted health
insurance model, a factor that adds greatly to both its policy and political
feasibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
To answer to the question posed by this Article's title, I am skeptical
that meaningful health reform can be accomplished at the state level, where
vast differences in the states' populations make replication difficult, and
frequent boom-and-bust economic cycles make financing almost
impossible. I am also philosophically skeptical of reform measures, such as
the individual mandate, which rely on enlarging and regulating the
individual insurance market rather than on widely pooling insurance risks.
But I am also aware of the opposition that many Americans have to social
insurance, i.e. the fact that the healthy and perhaps even the wealthier carry
a disproportionate share of the cost of health care. The fact that single-
payer government-financed health insurance has been and continues to be a
non-starter is evidence of the general opposition to social insurance reform,
particularly a reform proposal that dismantles and replaces a familiar
existing system. I think that Medicare is a social insurance anomaly in
America, acceptable because of the characteristics of the population--older
Americans, many of whom are retired and living on fixed incomes.
Whether a proposal to expand Medicare to the relatively small uninsured
working population would be acceptable to a majority of legislators, voters,
and vested interest groups is a policy effort worth pursuing. Its success
requires the kind of political leadership, passion, and commitment that
Governor Schwarzenegger demonstrated in California but that has been
sorely lacking at the national level. To paraphrase Mark Pauly, we have to
do something because the economic consequences of non-action are
becoming too alarming. More importantly, however, we must do something
because it's the right thing to do.
109 Hacker, supra note 107, at 2-3.
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